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CONSUMER PROBLEMS AND
ADR: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSIONORDERED GENERAL MOTORS
MEDIATION AND
ARBITRATION PROGRAM
Arthur Best'
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article evaluates a controversial mediation and arbitration program
established by General Motors (GM) for owners of certain cars. It began in 1984,
under the terms of a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) consent order settling
charges that GM had deceptively failed to inform buyers that particular models of
cars contained components that had unusually low durability. When the settlement
was proposed, debate centered on whether the public interest would be served best
by: 1) creation of mediation and arbitration opportunities for individual owners;
or 2) prosecution of a single action seeking uniform compensation for all owners.
One commissioner feared that the dispute resolution process "could substitute
'random redress' for the automatic restitution to which these consumers are
entitled."' Twenty-nine state attorneys general wrote that "the amount of redress
will turn on factors personal to each consumer, and not necessarily on the vehicle
problem."2 A commissioner in favor of the settlement replied that it "offers the
Commission the fastest and indeed the only feasible way to redress the injury
suffered by many GM owners."3

* Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. This Article is based on a paper
presented at the 1989 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association. A grant from the National
Institute for Dispute Resolution, for the development of teaching materials, supported early work on
this project. Thanks are gratefully given to Professor David A. Barnes, who helped generously with
(but is not responsible for) statistical analysis. Two University of Denver law students also gave
valuable assistance: Deborah Bayles, of the class of 1991, and Michael Byorick, of the class of 1989.
1. Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,010 (May 2, 1983) (Separate Statement of Commissioner
Pertschuk Concerning Consent Agreement with General Motors Corporation).
2. Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1138, at 728 (Nov. 3, 1983).
3. Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 22,010 (May 2, 1983) (Separate Statement of Commissioner Patricia
P. Bailey Concerning Consent Agreement with General Motors Corporation).
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Although the commissioners did not refer to academic literature,' their
positions raised issues of primary concern to dispute resolution scholarship. Does
obtaining the benefits of non-traditional procedures, such as speed, fairness, and
satisfaction for individual disputants, justify giving up the benefits of authoritative
and coercive dispute resolution, such as establishment of clear rules for future
conduct and allocation of redress to a broader class of recipients? How accurate
are the descriptions of the strengths and weaknesses of alternative dispute
resolution procedures?
Using reports of 81,055 cases processed in the GM program in 144 cities in
a thirty-four month period, this article compares the program's performance with
the expectations its proponents have expressed, and evaluates it in the broader
context of the adaptability of alternative forms of dispute resolution to consumer
problems. The program has reached only a small fraction of the individuals
potentially affected by GM's alleged misconduct. For those cases it did process,
the program seemingly failed to give similar cases similar treatment, despite the
hope that it would produce fair results well matched to the circumstances of
particular cases. A full calculation of the resources devoted to the program calls
into question any claim that it produced overall economic savings. With respect
to savings of time, redress has been directed to some consumers more quickly than
might have been the case with a single government action aimed at mass
compensation. However, the program's ability to process individual cases in less
time than full-fledged FTC-GM litigation would have required has provided only
slight benefit to consumers who used the program after its initial few years of
operation, and has provided no benefit at all to consumers who have never used
it.
From a law enforcement perspective, the program has significant weaknesses.
It did not produce major savings of cost or time, yet it may have redressed only
a small proportion of the total consumer injury and it apparently produced varied
results in cases with similar facts. A less complicated method of redress such as
uniform payments to owners of the affected vehicles might have been a better
public response to an alleged pattern of wrongdoing. Operation of the program
does show, however, that many buyers are willing to use alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) as part of a seller's complaint handling process. Flaws in the
program that make it an unsatisfactory means of government deceptive trade
practice regulation would be far less detrimental in the context of a voluntarily
established complaint handling mechanism offered to customers for buyer-seller

4. A recent article suggests that the ways in which academic students of dispute resolution
organize their research and characterize their discipline control or "enable" the debates about such
processes within the institutions which the academics study. The total lack of attention to scholarly
work by those involved in creating the FTC-GM settlement provides an instance in which this 'scholarcentered" hypothesis fails to provide an accurate description of reality (unless a claim can be made that
the real actors in the debate were influenced unconsciously by the work of academics). See Silbey &
Sarat, Dispute Processing in Law and Legal Scholarship: From Institutional Critiqueto Reconstruction of the JuridicalSubject, 66 DEN. U.L REv. 437, 440 (1989) ("The struggle within the field of
institutional practice is enabled by the outcome of a particular struggle among legal scholars.").
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disputes in general. Creating any additional medium of consumer redress is likely
to benefit any buyers who learn about it and use it.
II. THE FTC-GM SETTLEMENT
A. FTC Allegations
Reacting to consumer complaints, published articles and other information,
the FTC began in 1979 to investigate whether certain components used in a variety
of GM vehicles had unusually high failure rates.5 The agency issued a formal
complaint in 1980, charging that three vehicle components 6 all exhibited worse
than normal performance and durability, that GM knew or should have known
about it, and that GM's failure to disclose it to buyers violated the FTC Act. 7
Failure to disclose information about a product's atypical attributes violates the
FTC Act if the information concerns something important and if consumers, in the
absence of explicit information, are likely to assume that the attribute has typical
characteristics." Motors and transmissions are important, and buyers are likely
to assume that their durability is within the normal range unless a car seller
reveals that they are likely to fail sooner or more often than such components
typically do.
As many as twenty million cars may have been involved in the alleged
violation. 9 Camshafts and lifters involved in the case were used in vehicles sold
as Chevrolets, Buicks, Oldsmobiles, and Pontiacs, manufactured from the
beginning of the 1974 model year through April, 1983. The engines involved in
the case, known as 305 and 350 cubic inch displacement engines, were used in a
variety of vehicles manufactured for sale in the years 1974 through 1983, and the
transmission that was allegedly of low durability, the THM 200, was used in
various GM passenger cars from 1976 through 1982.1°

5. Nicks & Leitner, FederalTradeCommission v. GeneralMotors: An Unsettling Settlement, 7
J. CONSUMER POL'Y 389, 393 (1984).
6. The components were described in the complaint as THM-200 automatic transmissions
produced since 1975 by Hydra-Matic Division, camshafts or lifters in 305- or 350-cubic inch
displacement engines produced by Chevrolet Division, and fuel-injection pumps or injectors in diesel
engines produced by Oldsmobile Division since 1977.
7. General Motors Corp., 102 F.T.C. 1741 (1983).
8. See, e.g., Thompson Medical Co. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied,479 U.S.
1086 (1987) ("Aspercreme" was deceptive when used as the name of an analgesic ointment that
contained no aspirin).
9. Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1112, at 872 (April 28, 1983). Other estimates are
lower. For example, the Washington Post reported that one of the named components, the allegedly
defective transmission, was installed in at least 3.3 million cars. Wash. Post, August 8, 1983, at D.C.
11.
10. Wisconsin Justice Department, ARBITRATION INFORMATION KIT (GENERAL MOTORS).
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B. Probable Uniformity of Consumer Harm
The homogeneity of the potentially large number of instances of consumer
injury involved in the case is relevant to evaluating the settlement. The specified
components were 'used over many years in many different models of vehicles.
Thus, any unusually poor performance could have had different consequences for
various owners of the vehicles in which they were installed. On the other hand,
the instances of possible consumer abuse in this case must have much less
variation than would be found in other groups of consumer experiences with
substandard purchases, where the universe of purchases might be all cars, and the
flaws might be shortcomings in any features of the cars. The specified components are, in fact, three narrowly defined automobile parts that can fail in ways
that are less numerous than potential failures of all automobile parts. The idea
that specified components problems are likely to be less diverse than problems
with other attributes of automobiles is supported, inferentially, by the FTC-GM
settlement itself. Besides committing GM to offering ADR for buyer-seller
disputes involving the specified components, the settlement also provides that
ADR shall be available for disputes involving automobile powertrains. The
definitions of "specified components" and "powertrain" highlight the narrowness
of the definition of "specified components." The specified components are:
"THM 200 automatic transmissions," "camshafts or lifters in 305 or 350
cubic-inch displacement (CID) gasoline engines" produced in Chevrolet
plants, and "fuel injection pumps or fuel injectors in 350 CID diesel
engines" produced in Oldsmobile plants."
In contrast to this limited list of specifically identified components,
"powertrain" parts are defined as:
cylinder blocks and heads, and all internal parts, including camshafts
and lifters, manifolds, timing gears, timing gear chains or belts and
covers,. flywheels, harmonic balancers, valve covers, oil pans, oil
pumps, engine mounts, seals and gaskets, water pumps and fuel pumps,
and diesel injection pumps; also, turbocharger housings and internal
parts, turbocharger valves, seals and gaskets... [transmission] [clases
and all internal parts, torque converters, vacuum modulators, seals and
gaskets, and transmission mounts; also, transfer cases and all internal
parts, seals and gaskets. 2
Since the marketing impropriety alleged in the case was the failure to reveal
specific weaknesses in three vehicle components, it can be said theoretically that
GM's conduct caused identical injuries to all buyers, to the extent that the buyers
paid more for the cars than they would have paid if accurate information about the
weaknesses had been disclosed. In this sense, the consumer problems involved
in the case have great uniformity, since they started out as identical instances of
nondisclosure of a product's inherent weakness. In another sense, the product

11. GeneralMotors Corp., 102 F.T.C. at 1750.
12. Id. at 1753-54.
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failures are not uniform, since the allegedly weak components did not all fail in
the same way or at the same time. Nonetheless, the settlement's coverage does
represent a group of potential problems far narrower than all problems with all
vehicles or even all GM vehicles. The FTC has noted that in broad outline there
are similarities among all the problems possibly present among vehicles covered
by the settlement. 3
C. Analogous FTC Cases
In several similar cases, the FTC obtained settlement provisions providing
redress to owners of affected vehicles either automatically or upon satisfaction of
very simple requirements. For example, Chrysler Corporation agreed in 1980 to
replace rusted front fenders on certain cars or reimburse owners who had
previously made such replacements, requiring only that customers sign a statement
that rust had appeared within the first three years of use of the car.' 4 Honda
made a similar agreement, also related to front fenders subject to premature
rusting, in 1982.15 Ford agreed to a uniform extension of warranty periods to
permit compensation to owners of particular 1979 and 1980 model cars that had
been subject6 to piston scuffing, allegedly due to the absence of necessary oil
squirtholes.1
D. Settlement Terms and Early Reactions
In the GM case, FTC staff attorneys negotiated a settlement, which the FTC
provisionally approved in April, 1983,'17 and finally approved, by a 3-2 vote, in
November, 1983.8 GM refused to provide uniform redress as Honda, Chrysler
and Ford had done previously. Instead, it agreed to offer owners of vehicles with
the specified components the opportunity to participate in a combined mediation
and one-way-binding arbitration program operated by a Better Business Bureau

13. The FTC implicitly concedes that cases eligible for treatment in the program have large
similarities. A Bureau of Consumer Protection analysis of statistical data stated: "[T]he number of
consumers with a specified component complaint participating in the program is expected to decline
over the duration of the program. This is partly due to the fact that only a certain number of vehicles
with specified components were manufactured, and these vehicles are getting older and have higher
mileage." Analysis of Data on Results of General Motors' Third PartyArbitration ProgramFor the
Period October 1985 Through July 1987, FTC Press Release (Sept. 9, 1988) at 4-5 (hereinafter FTC
Analysis 1985-87).
14. Chrysler Corp., Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,677 (August 12, 1980). The company had
previously replaced rusted fenders free or at reduced cost to customers who had complained. The
settlement required Chrysler to mail notices about the program to car owners in states where road
conditions made the problem particularly likely to occur.
15. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 99 F.T.C. 305 (1982).
16. Ford Motor Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,662 (October 2, 1980).
17. Trade Reg. Rep., supra note 3.
18. GeneralMotors Corp., 102 F.T.C. 1741.
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(BBB) in each of a large number of cities. 9 The program has two parts. The
owner of a car within its coverage who presents his or her problem to a
participating BBB is asked to quantify the redress he or she wants. GM then has
the opportunity to offer a settlement payment. GM and the BBBs characterize this
process as mediation. For consumers who reject the "mediation" offer, the
provides arbitration that will be binding on GM but not on the consumprogram
20
er.
As outlined in the Introduction,21 controversy surrounded the settlement.
One commissioner was strongly opposed to the use of case-by-case dispute
resolution,22 one considered it inferior to direct redress but worthy of support
because GM would not agree to other settlement terms,23 and another considered
it preferable to litigation seeking direct redress because it would make more
money available to consumers than would probably be available through
litigation. 24 The commissioner most in favor of the settlement stated that "[I]t
nevertheless provides an immediacy of relief and a far higher degree of certainty
for a much wider range of injured consumers than the Commission could expect

19. GM also promised to publicize the program and make its formerly confidential service
bulletins available to the public. "Specified components" has been used as a term of art by the FTC,
GM and Better Business Bureaus. The term refers to the particular components alleged by the FTC
to have been of deficient durability. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. The GM
mediation-arbitration program was expanded by GM to cover more cars and types of problems than
the consent order required, but the cases involving "specified components" have been tabulated
separately, to comply with a reporting provision of the consent settlement.
20. In General Motors Corp. v. Abrams, 703 F. Supp. 1103, 1110 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that
a New York state statute was preempted by the FTC-GM consent order) reversed, General Motors
Corp. v. Abrams, 897 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1990), the court described the arbitration phase of the GM
program, quoting in part from an affidavit by a BBB official:
[A]rbitration is an informal procedure at which both parties explain their positions to an
impartial lay arbitrator or arbitrators. The arbitrators are volunteers representing broad
segments of the local community. Having heard the parties, the arbitrators "are then free
to make common sense adjudications based on their own sense of fairness." . . . [T]hey
are instructed to "apply their own concept of fairness to the facts in the cases they hear.
They are not taught the various state laws which would apply if the disputes they were
hearing had been brought in court. In fact, while the arbitrators are told that they may
allow parties to present the substantive law from the state where they are sitting or even
from other states, they are specifically instructed that they are not to apply any particular
law, but instead are to do what they personally believe is right.
General Motors Corp. v. Abrams, 703 F. Supp. at 1110.
21. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
22. Commissioner Pertschuk wrote that "case-by-case arbitrations of a common defect, in which
each consumer has to prove a right to redress, is wrong in concept and in operation." GeneralMotors
Corp., 102 F.T.C. at 1744 (Separate Statement of Commissioner Pertschuk) (emphasis added).
23. "The settlement here would be... preferable to me... if it provided direct redress.... The
plain fact is that altering the order in these various ways is simply not an alternative available to us
in the context of a settlement." Id. at 1745 (Separate Statement of Commissioner Patricia P. Bailey).
24. "According to my estimates, the value to consumers in terms of redress by arbitration will
approach ... six times the expected value of the consumer redress that could be anticipated through
litigation." Id. at 1949 (Separate Statement of Commissioner George W. Douglas).
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to secure through litigation."' A similar view was expressed by the agency's
Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, who praised the settlement's
dispute resolution procedures as "fair, fast and impartial. 26 The commissioner
most opposed to the settlement argued that "[t]he only rational and equitable
remedy for the common injury suffered in a case like this is automatic compensapitting individual consumers against
tion for damages, not standardless mini-trials
27
the largest company in the world!"

II. THE PERSPECTIVE OF ADR SCHOLARSHIP
Scholarship on alternative dispute resolution provides a further context for
evaluating the settlement. With a great deal of individual variation in supporting
evidence, and citing many different bases in public policy, proponents of ADR
usually suggest that its use will ameliorate the problem of overloaded dockets in
conventional courts. 8 They argue that avoiding the delays of the standard
judicial system will save money for the disputants (as well as for the government). 29 Although they use many definitions of justice, ADR scholars sometimes
have contended that the results it produces will be better than those achieved in
other modes, since they are less likely to turn on issues of procedure.30 The
decision-maker in ADR may be the parties themselves, cooperatively," or an
expert selected for knowledge and skill rather than mere impartiality.32 A great
deal of writing on ADR recognizes that disputes have many characteristics, and
that an ideal match between a particular dispute and a type of ADR will be
determined by a range of factors such as the likelihood that the disputants share
a desire to continue a relationship in the future,33 the disputants' cultural
expectations concerning their rights and the process of disputing, 34 and the
balance of power between the disputants.35

25. lId at 1745.
26. Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep., supra note 9, at 872.
27. GeneralMotors Corp., 102 F.T.C. at 1744 (Separate Statement of Commissioner Pertschuk).

28. Lieberman & Henry, Lessons from the Alternative DisputeResolution Movement, 53 U. CHI.
L REV. 424, 427, 432 (1986); Abrahams, Mediation: The New Move Toward Justice Without Judges,
65 JUDICATURE 493, 494 (1982); Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?,
99 HARv. L. REV. 668, 669 (1986).
29. Snyder, Rhetoric and Reality in the Dispute Resolution Movement, 1984 Mo. J. DiSP. RESOL.
5; Feinberg, Mediation: A Preferred Method ofDispute Resolution, 16 PEPPERDINE L REv. S5 (1989).
30. Nyhart & Dauer, A Preliminary Analysis of the Uses of Scientific Models in Dispute
Prevention, Management and Resolution, 1986 Mo. J. DisP. RESOIL 29; Feinberg, supra note 29, at
S7; Lieberman & Henry, supra note 28, at 428-31.
31. Fuller, Mediation: Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL L REV. 305, 325-26 (1971); Nyhart
& Dauer, supra note 30, at 32.
32. Lieberman & Henry, supra note 30, at 431.
33. Fuller, supra note 31, at 325-27.
34. Merry, Disputing Without Culture, 100 HARv. L REV. 2057, 2072 (1987).
35. See Nader, Disputing Without the Force of Law, 88 YALE L. J. 998, 1001-02 (1979).
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A major concern in evaluating dispute resolution processes is that expediency
may supplant justice as the fundamental goal. It has been argued that disputants
derive benefits from participating in the standard litigation process that cannot be
equaled in alternative systems. 36 It is also suggested that important society-wide
benefits of traditional litigation are lost when disputes are treated in alternative
processes.37 Opponents of ADR have argued that it may deprive disputants of
important aspects of fairness and justice, and that concentrating on measures such
as speed of resolution or numbers of cases resolved distracts attention from that
fundamental shortcoming.38 Professor Stephen N. Subrin has characterized
which avoid standard litigation as "bargaining
contemporary resolution practices
39
in the shadow of a shadow."
Some of the debate about the quality of justice in alternative processes is
equivalent to the broader question of defining justice itself, in any setting.
Professor David Luban has characterized four criteria for measuring the quality of
justice in ADR.' They are participant satisfaction, the furtherance of social
justice, empowerment of the parties and facilitation of the parties' abilities to
acknowledge each other's perspectives, and common humanity. 4' ProfessoRobert Baruch Bush has carefully outlined the variety of responses that scholars
and practitioners of dispute resolution give to the question of what represents
quality in dispute resolution, and has suggested a categorization of typical
formulations.42 Analysis of the FTC-GM settlement may illuminate whether
certain of these conceptualizations of quality can be achieved in practice. They
include:
individual satisfaction,43 individual autonomy," social control,45
social justice," social solidarity,47 and personal transformation. 4
Luban's and Bush's overlapping taxonomies include attributes that may have
some mutual inconsistencies. For example, participant satisfaction may not be

36. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage ofAdjudicative Service and the Need for
a Two-Tier TrialSystem in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L REV. 1808 (1986); Subrin & Dykstra, Notice and
the Right to be Heard: The Significanceof Old Friends, 9 HARv. Civ. C.R.-C.L L REv. 449 (1974).
37. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
38. Menkel-Meadow, Judges and Settlement: What Part Should Judges Play?, TRiAL, Oct. 1985,
at 24.
39. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The FederalRules of Civil Procedure in
Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L REV. 909, 989 (1987).
40. Luban, The Quality of Justice, 66 U. DEN. L REV. 381, 401-02 (1989).
41. Id.
42. Bush, Defining Quality in Dispute Resolution: Taxonomies andAnti-Taxonomies of Quality
Arguments, 66 DEN. U. L REv. 335 (1989).
43. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHio ST. U. 29, 34 (1982).
44. Stulberg, The Theory and Practiceof Mediation: A Reply to ProfessorSusskind, 6 VERMONT
L REv. 85 (1981).
45. See L Nader, The RecurrentDialectic Between Legality and its Alternatives: The Limits of
Binary Thinking (Book Review), 132 U. PA. L REv. 621 (1984).
46. Resnick, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L REv. 837 (1984).
47. Resnick, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L REV. 405 (1987).
48. Riskin, supra note 43, at 34.
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achieved in some settings consistently with social justice; empowerment of parties
may or may not lead to social justice or social solidarity. A full evaluation of the
GM-BBB program and the context in which it has operated could reveal whether
these possible contradictions have serious practical consequences.
For all conceptions of the role dispute resolution processes may play in
promoting or delivering just orderings of societal relationships, an important set
of questions involves identifying the disputants entering the processes and the
types of disputes involved. For consumer disputes, analysis should begin with
identifying flaws that buyers perceive in purchases.49 Professor Marc Galanter's
Past rework involving the prevalence of litigation supports this approach.
search has shown strikingly little use of third parties by people involved in
consumer disputes. 1 Some have sought to explain this avoidance by examining
how much knowledge potential complainants have about techniques of complaining, or by pointing to the costs involved in making complaints. 2 Another
perspective involves social orientation towards disputing or avoidance. 3
Professor Carol Greenhouse has demonstrated that antipathy towards disputing can
itself be a central attribute of people's notions of how to conduct themselves in
society. 4 In other work, the concept of rights consciousness has been central in
the attempt to explain lower than expected complaint-making conduct.5 5 It is
indicative of the elusiveness of the issue of "exit," people's tendency to opt out
of the dispute resolution process, that the FTC and New York's Attorney General
have each praised automobile dispute resolution systems in reports that merely

49. A. BEST, WHEN CONSUMERS COMPLAIN (1981). Defining the total universe of consumer
abuse, I characterized product shortcomings unknown to buyers as problems in part of my analysis.
This was criticized in Silbey, Who Speaks for the Consumer? (Book Review), 1984 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 429 (1984). Throughout the book's treatment of "unvoiced complaints," however, all analysis
was based on product or service deficiencies that respondents actually described. To explore the
efficacy of ADR institutions in treating disputes, the most logical starting place is the group of
problems buyers actually perceive.
50. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think
We Know) About our Allegedly Contentious and LitigiousSociety, 31 U.C.L.A. L REV. 4 (1983).
51. Ladinsky & Susmilch, Community Factors in the Brokerage of Consumer Product and Service
Problems (1983) (University of Wisconsin-Madison Disputes Processing Research Program Working
Paper); WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THEORY AND RESEARCH, (Geis & Stotland, eds., Sage Publications
1980).
52. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 L & SoC'Y REV. 63
(1974); Ladinsky & Susmilch, supra note 51; No ACCESS TO LAW: ALTERNATIVES TO THE AMERICAN
JUDICIAL SYSTEM

(L Nader ed. 1980).

53. Coates and Penrod, Social Psychology and the Emergence of Disputes, 15 L & Soc'Y REV.
655 (1980-81); Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaming, Claiming..., 15 L & Soc'Y REV. 631 (1980-1981).
54. C. GREENHOUSE, PRAYING FOR JUSTICE: FAITH, ORDER AND COMMUNITY INAN AMERICAN
TOwN (1986).
55. Harrington, Socio-Legal Concepts in Mediation Ideology, 9 LEGAL STUDIES F. 33 (1985);
McEwen and Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance Through Conseni;
18 L & SOc'Y REV. 11 (1984); Merry & Silbey, What do PlaintiffsWant? Reexamining the Concept
of Dispute, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 151 (1984).
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state numbers of cases processed and amounts of refunds ordered paid to
buyers.56 Understanding why some people who are aware of a problem may
avoid seeking redress is fundamentally important to designing effective responses
to consumer abuse. It must be remembered, additionally, that it would promote
economic justice to provide compensation to all victims of a consumer problem,
including those who are unaware of the shortcomings of a flawed product.
IV. FTC ANALYSIS OF THE PROGRAM
The FTC published statistical reports on the program's operation in 1985,"'
1986,5g and 1988, 59 and accompanied the data with staff analyses and press
releases quoting the agency's chairman.' This Article's statistical analysis is
based on data released in 1988, describing the performance of the program in 144
cities from October 1985 through July 1987.61
In the period covered by the FTC report, the data show that 81,055
consumers participated in the program, and that GM made payments totalling
approximately $22 million.62 Cases resolved in mediation numbered 70,340.
Mediation required a consumer to prepare a claim and present it in person or by
mail to a BBB office, and required GM employees to analyze the case and present
an offer to the consumer through the medium of a BBB employee. There were
11,140 cases pursued beyond the mediation stage to arbitration. Arbitration
required in-person appearances by the consumer and a GM representative, and
required the work of a volunteer arbitrator to conduct the hearing and write an
opinion. Also, 23,707 individuals requested redress but did not accept a mediation
offer or choose to participate in arbitration.63 There is no information available
regarding how many people might have learned about the claim process but
decided not to enter the program at all.
In material released with the statistical information, the FTC's chairman,
Daniel Oliver, described the program as an "overwhelming success" that "shows
government, private industry, consumer groups, and individual consumers working

56. Lemon Law Update,Arbitration Times, (Spring 1988) (N.Y. attorney general's praise of New
York's lemon-law system).
57. FTC Press Release (June 25, 1985); FrC Press Release (October 24, 1985).
58. FTC Press Release (September 22, 1986).
59. FTC Press Release (September 23, 1988).
60. Quotations from the chairman are included only in the press releases of June 25, 1985, and
September 23, 1988.
61. FTC Analysis 1985-87, supra note 13.
62. An analysis by the FrC Bureau of Consumer Protection states that "$21,598,621.14 was
dispersed (sic) to consumers." Is this a Freudian slip for "disbursed"? To disburse means to pay. To
disperse means to cause to evaporate or vanish, to cause to be spread widely, or even to break up in
random fashion (as when a crowd disperses). FTC Analysis 1985-87, supra note 13, at 3.
A context for the large $22 million figure is GM's estimated sales volume of $107,757 million
for a recent twelve-month period. Flint, Automotive, FORBES, Jan. 9, 1989, at 91.
63. An unknown proportion of these people were served by another GM-BBB program established
under the consent order and limited to power-train components.
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together for the common good."' The staff report concluded that "the mediation/arbitration program is very beneficial to consumers and is operating
efficiently." 65 It also noted a wide range in individual settlements, and stated that
"[s]ince each case is a unique set of circumstances and is decided on an individual
basis, this variation of payments was foreseen. Consumers seek a wide range of
payments and receive a wide range of compensation."'
These views are
apparently based on the large total dollar amount of redress and the large number
of program participants. However, this assessment fails to consider whether the
program's size indicated that most of the eligible consumers were being served by
it or whether the compensation provided was as large and as well-directed as
fairness would require. This approach ignores issues (discussed in the Article's
next section) which a straightforward examination of the data would have
suggested. Large unexplained differences appear among the participating cities.
While varied individual results in different cases would be expected, varied
average results in different cities are surprising, unless there are large differences
in the types of cars or types of car owners from city to city. For example, a
comparison can be made between two cities with similar caseloads: Houston,
which processed 1,016 cases, and Akron, which processed 1,026 cases. The mean
mediation settlement in Houston was $352.39, compared with a mean in Akron of
$240.56. The mean arbitration award in Houston was $223.26, while the mean in
Akron was $113.08. Mediation represented 68 percent of the caseload in Houston,
and 90 percent of the caseload in Akron.
Earlier comments by an FTC chairman and earlier staff analyses accompanying data releases for prior periods of the program's operation also reflect an
uncritical evaluation. They highlight the total numbers of participants and total
amounts of redress, while ignoring evidence of possible flaws in the program's
operation. In connection with release of data on the program's 1984 operation
FTC chairman James C. Miller III was quoted as saying "We are extremely
pleased at these results .... [W]e were successful in getting money directly into
the hands of consumers in a short period of time."67 The staff analysis covering
that data noted that individual consumers received different results from the
program, but stated that "[t]he very advantage of the arbitration program is that,
unlike traditional redress programs or class actions, different problems can be
addressed individually, and relief can be provided that is appropriate to the

64. FTC Press Release, supra note 59.
65. FTC Analysis 1985-87, supra note 13, at 5.

See also Adams, Consumer Complaint

Arbitration: The Corporate View, 43 ARB. J.41, 43 (Dec. 1988) ("Inherent strengths of the arbitration
process were further documented in a recently completed analysis of GM's consumer arbitration
program.... The program was able to deal flexibly with a wide range of individual circumstances.").
66. FTC Analysis 1985-87, supra note 13, at 3.

67. FTC Press Release (June 25, 1985).
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specific circumstances of each case."' The same idea was expressed in a staff
analysis of data covering a later period of the program's work (its first twenty
months). The staff analysis stated: "The wide range in settlements and awards
underscores one of the primary attributes of the program; the ability to deal
flexibly with individual consumer claims."69
V. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PROGRAM
Individual cases in the program undoubtedly should have different outcomes.
However, it is this study's hypothesis that if the program has treated cases
equitably, individual cities in which it operates should have roughly similar records
in terms of all the important measures of their operation. In particular, cities with
relatively high caseloads should produce results similar to those of cities with
relatively low caseloads. Proportions of cases resolved in mediation (and therefore
proportions of cases resolved in the post-mediation phase of arbitration) should be
similar among the program's cities. The means for measures such as the amounts
requested by complainants, mediation settlement amounts, arbitration requests and
arbitration awards should not show marked variation among program cities. This
hypothesis is based on the idea that while individual cases might have some
variation in harm claimed and harm actually suffered, the entire group of cases at
any city probably was comparable to the entire group of cases at other cities;
therefore, the mean or averagevalues for various quantitative measures should not
vary much from city to city.
A related hypothesis is that variations (with statistical and practical
significance) among the means in the program's cities suggest that there have been
systematic failures to provide resolutions tailored to the unique circumstances of
particular cases. If consumers receive more money in some cities than in others,
while types of consumers and types of vehicle deficiencies can be assumed, on
average, to be similar from place to place, the FTC and independent researchers
ought to acknowledge the reality of these differences, and should seek to explain
them.
The published data cover a number of aspects of the program for each
participating BBB. Since each BBB unit operates in a separate location, it is
convenient to refer to them by city. For each city's mediated cases, the data
report the mean amount requested, mean settlement amount, mean settlement as
a percent of mean request, and the total number of (mediated) cases. For
arbitrated cases, the data report the mean amount requested, the mean offer made

68. FTC Memorandum, from Roger N. Kirkpatrick and Lewis Silversin to the Commission, June
23, 1985, at 5 (Subject: Preliminary Data on General Motors Arbitration Program Required by
Commission Consent Order in Docket 9145). This statement is repeated verbatim in a staff analysis
that was released several months later in 1985, accompanying a fuller release of data from the
program's early months of operation. See Analysis of Data on Results of General Motors, Third Party
Arbitration Program, FTC Press Release (Oct. 24, 1985) at 4.
69. FTC Analysis 1985-87, supra note 13, at 4.
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to and rejected by the consumer in mediation, the mean award, the mean award
as a percent of the mean request, and the total number of (arbitrated) cases. The
data report for each city the overall consumer recovery in both mediation and
arbitration as a percent of the total amounts requested. Three variables have been
derived from data reported by the FTC in other forms. One is the percent of total
caseload resolved through mediation. A second is each city's percentage of fullytreated cases (the ratio of cases reported as completed to the total of cases reported
as completed and cases reported as "left program"). The third variable reports the
ratio of cases with repairs to total cases, since free repairs are provided as part of
the resolution of some cases.
The FTC has not reported individual case data for each city, but has only
reported means, summary percentages and total numbers of cases and repairs.
This precludes a typical statistical significance analysis, such as one that would
analyze the different cities to determine whether they had significantly different
characteristics. Because only means or totals for the values in each city (and not
the standard deviations) were released, the data cannot be analyzed to make
comparisons between individual cities. An analysis can, however, group the cities
according to certain attributes, calculate the means of each group's means for
various program attributes, and then explore the statistical significance of
variations among those means of means. The mean for any city is a characteristic
of that city. For example, a typical hypothesis in this study is that cities where
dispute settlement is dominated by mediation (and arbitration is therefore
infrequent) have different characteristics from cities where mediation is less
prevalent. Grouping cities by high and low mediation ratios allows us to
determine the significance of differences between the mean mediation ratios of the
two groups of cities.
Table 1 illustrates differences of statistical and practical significance between
groups of cities for every important variable associated with this program. When
the cities are ranked according to the mean mediation amounts requested in each
city, the mean of the mean mediation request in the 36 cities in the highest
quartile is $666.90. The mean of the mean mediation amount request in the 37
cities in the lowest quartile is $460.80. Of greater importance than amounts
requested, however, is amounts actually received.
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TABLE 1
PROGRAM ATTRIBUTES AMONG 144 CITIES
(Means of Means in Cities in Top and
Bottom Quartiles for Each Attribute)"

Attribute

Bottom
Quartile

Top
Quartile

Mean mediation
request ($)

460.80

666.90

Mean mediation
settlement ($)

236.90

377.70

Mean arbitration
request ($)

407.80

871.02

Mean mediation
offer refused by
arbitrating
claimant ($)

17.80

107.70

Mean arbitration
award ($)

70.82

342.23

Mean mediation
settlement as percent
of mean request (%)

47.1

61.3

Percent caseload
resolved in
mediation (%)

70.4

94.1

Mean arbitration
award as percent
of mean request (%)

11.5

57.4

0.7

2.6

Percent of cases
with repairs
obtained by owner (%)

70. Differences in each row are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.
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The mean of the means for cities in the highest quartile with respect to that
variable is $377.70. The mean of the means for cities in the lowest quartile is
$236.90. The difference of greater than $140 is huge, in the context of a $236 to
$377 range. It represents about 60 percent of the $236 figure for the lowest
quartile cities.
Means of cities' mean arbitration awards present an even starker pattern of
possibly disparate treatment of consumers: the mean of the lowest quartile cities'
means for arbitration awards is $17.80,71 while the comparable figure for highest
quartile cities is $107.70. The figure for the highest quartile cities is six times as
great as the figure for the lowest quartile cities.
An initial hypothesis to explain the variations in these attributes was that
programs with high caseloads might develop patterns different from those with low
caseloads. This might be expected because intake personnel might become
familiar with the results in past cases and might communicate encouragement or
discouragement to claimants. In the BBB program, mediation does not require an
in-person appearance by a GM representative, since GM makes its offer in writing
or by telephone to a BBB employee. Arbitration, however, requires both the
claimant and a GM employee to attend the hearing. Possibly, a high volume of
cases may lead the GM personnel to make more generous initial offers than they
would make where low overall case volume decreases the risk that frequent
appearances at arbitrations will be required. Another consequence of high
caseload might be that the GM representatives may become conditioned to
participation in the program and more willing to approve payments that could
seem unusual to less habituated representatives.
When cities are grouped into the bottom and top quartiles with respect to
total caseloads, statistically significant differences appear between the values
present in each quartile for the following variables: amount received in mediated
settlements, the percentage of claimants' requests obtained in mediated settlements,
the percentage of all claimants' requests obtained through both mediation and
arbitration, and the proportion which mediation represents of the cities' total
caseloads. Table 2 shows the values for the means of the means of the variables
for which there was statistically significant variation between cities in the high and
low caseload volume quartiles. Illustratively, the mean of the mean mediation
settlement amounts consumers receive in the cities in the lowest quartile of
caseload size was $289.38. The corresponding amount for cities in the highest
quartile of caseload size was $327.45. This suggests that many cases processed
in the system might have been subject to variation in the range of plus or minus
at least ten percent due merely to the accident of their being presented at a low
or a high volume location.

71. The low value for bottom-quartile cities is affected by the presence in the sample of some
cities in which no arbitrations occurred, so that a value of zero is reflected in the calculation.
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Table 2
72
VARIABLES WHICH HAVE STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT
VARIATION ACCORDING TO CITIES' TOTAL CASELOADS

Variable

Bottom Quartile Cities
(137 or Fewer Cases)

Top Quartile Cities
(715 or More Cases)

289.38

327.45

Mediation settlement as
percent of request

51.7

56.7

Total awards as percent
of total requests

46.6

53.0

Mediated cases as percent
of total cases

78.1

86.0

Mediation settlement
accepted

Another indication of the significance of a program's total caseload appears
when the programs are grouped according to the mean settlements in mediation.
Cities in the highest quartile on that measure had mean mediation settlements of
$346.26 or more. Cities in the, lowest quartile on that measure had mean
mediation settlements of $265.65 or less. While there is no reason that cities
processing many cases would handle cases deserving higher payments than the
cases in cities which process relatively fewer cases, the mean total number of
mediated cases in the low settlement payment cities was 327.6, compared with
687.9 for the same measure in high settlement payment cities.
Another attribute in which there was large variation among cities was the
percentage of caseload resolved in mediation. It ranged from a low of 14.3 to a
high of 100. Cities in the lowest quartile on this measure resolved an average
78.1 percent of their cases in mediation, while cities in the highest quartile
resolved an average 91.1 percent of cases that way. The cities where mediation
more strongly dominates the dispute resolution program report values that have
statistically significant differences from the corresponding values for cities where
mediation is less prevalent. The differences show that those cities yield consumers
an overall higher percentage of consumers' requests than consumers receive in the
cities where mediation is less dominant. The comparable percentages are 46.6 and
51.3, representing a typical difference of about five percent. That percentage is
important, given that consumers in the program typically request at least $500.

72. Differences are significant at the .05 level.
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There is also a large difference in the mean of mean caseloads, with mediation
dominant in cities where caseloads are, on average, about twice as large as the
caseloads in cities where mediation is somewhat less dominant. These data are
shown in Table 3.
Table 3
73
VARIABLES WHICH HAVE STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT
VARIATION ACCORDING TO CITIES' PERCENTAGES OF
CASELOAD RESOLVED IN MEDIATION

Variable

Bottom Quartile
Cities (78.1%
cases resolved
in mediation)

Top Quartile
Cities (91.1%
cases resolved
in mediation)

Total awards as percent
of total requests

46.6

51.3

Cases completed (as
percent of total case
intake)

75.1

80.4

307.6

652.2

Total caseload

A regression analysis shows that several variables have large positive
relationships to a city's percentage of caseload resolved by mediation. These
factors are mediation awards as percents of mediation requests, arbitration
requests, and overall recoveries as a percent of total requests. Programs where
mediation represents a larger percentage of total case treatment are also programs
where consumers' overall success is higher.
In another effort to discover whether there are statistically significant
differences between the results for various program attributes among different
cities, two other groupings were defined. Each of these groups of cities processed,
in total, about one quarter of the whole program's caseload. One of the groups
is comprised of the cities with the lowest individual caseloads which processed,
as a group, about one-quarter of the total caseload in the program. The other
group is comprised of the cities with the highest individual caseloads which
processed, as a group, about one-quarter of the total program caseload. The low
caseload group includes 93 cities which processed a total of 19,355 cases. The
high caseload group includes seven cities which processed a total of 19,842 cases.
Cities in the low caseload group processed less than 560 cases each. Cities in the

73. Differences are significant at the .05 level.
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high caseload group processed more than 1,900 cases each. As is shown in Table
4, the two groups had statistically different mean values for total awards as a
percent of total requests, mediation awards as a percent of total mediation
requests, and for the ratio of mediation cases to total cases processed. For the
total awards as a percent of total requests, the mean value in the low volume cities
was about 49 percent, compared with about 56 percent in the high volume cities.
This reinforces the likelihood that there are aspects of the operation of the
program in high volume locations that favor consumers; or, correspondingly, that
it hurts consumers to have their cases treated at the lower volume locations.
Table 4
74
VARIABLES WHICH HAVE STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT
VARIATION BETWEEN LOW-VOLUME CITY GROUP AND
HIGH-VOLUME CITY GROUP

Variable

Lowest Volume
Cities Processing
Approximately 25%
of Program Caseload

Highest Volume
Cities Processing
Approximately 25%
of ProgramCaseload

Mediation awards as
percent of mediation
requests

53.2

58.7

Total awards as percent
of total requests

48.8

55.7

Percent caseload
resolved in mediation

82.8

87.3

VI. CONCLUSION
A. Fairness
The pattern of operation at the various program locations suggests that FTC
endorsements of the program have been simplistic. A lot of money has been
distributed, but there is considerable reason to question the fairness of its
allocation. The variations between groups of cities cannot reasonably be

74. Differences are significant at the .05 level.
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attributed to variations in the types of cars or car owners found in the various
cities. Only a few types of components are involved in all of the 81,055 cases
analyzed. Furthermore, variations among individual cases, such as vehicle age,
initial vehicle cost, individual driving styles, and individual response style to
consumer problems, could be expected to be distributed randomly among
participating cities. Since many participating cities processed hundreds of cases
each, the overall composition of caseloads in the various cities can be assumed to
have been fairly similar.
Further, if variation in results was explained by variation in the actual
condition of the cars whose alleged defects were the subjects of the cases, there
would be no link between the total caseload of a participating city and the results
achieved in the city, in terms of mean mediation settlement or other factors. Total
caseload and percentage of caseload treated through mediation seem to have a
positive influence on the absolute amounts of recoveries consumers receive and
on the relationship of those amounts to the claims consumers present. These
relationships suggest that factors in the programs, rather than in the population of
problems presented to the programs, have caused disparate treatment of similar
cases.
The data show that the apparent discrepancies in recoveries among cities are
genuine differences, far larger than random distribution would likely produce. The
differences among cities might be caused by variation in how the programs' staff
members react to consumers seeking to participate in the program, to variation in
the conduct and perceived incentives of GM personnel in different locations, or
to variation in training and supervision received by the volunteer arbitrators who
staff the program's arbitration phase. Alternatively, differences among cities
might be related to the composition of cases presented for treatment. While it is
reasonable to suppose that cases eligible for processing are randomly distributed
among the cities where the program operates, BBBs may have particular
prominence in some places. In those locations, individuals with car trouble would
be especially likely to seek redress through the BBB. This would affect the
severity of cases, on average, presented to the program in each city, since in a
place where access to the BBB was unusual, presumably a person would have to
be highly motivated to seek BBB help. Such a person would likely be one whose
car trouble was relatively severe, compared with the degree of car trouble that
might lead a person to a BBB in a place where use of BBBs was more common,
or where for any reason it was simpler to discover and enter the program.
A disadvantage of prosecuting a single FTC case to a possible conclusion
providing uniform payments to all owners of affected cars would have been a lack
of sensitivity to the particular circumstances of individual cases. Some owners
would have been overcompensated and some would have been undercompensated.
Apparently a similar result has occurred in the context of ADR, where welltailored results might have been anticipated (and where the FTC has stated,
apparently incorrectly, that they have been achieved). The number of instances
of each method's misallocation of compensation cannot be known, nor can the
magnitude of the misallocations be estimated. It seems clear, though, that ADR
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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has not produced results that demonstrate greater fairness than the rough justice
offered by litigation resulting in uniform payments. Precise and fair payments
directed to owners through ADR would have been ideal, but it seems that the
ADR process produced unexplained differences in similar cases when dispositions
are compared between groups of cities.
B. Economy
Most ADR proponents assert that non-traditional procedures are less costly
than standard litigation. For the FTC-GM settlement, a full accounting of all
expenditures suggests that cost savings have not been accomplished. It cannot be
known what the total expense of formal litigation of an FTC action seeking
uniform redress would have been. However, the costs expended in the GM
program under the settlement can be described. Each mediated case required a
personal visit or detailed correspondence and telephone communications by the
aggrieved vehicle owner. It also required analysis by GM personnel. Each
arbitrated case involved all of the expenses of mediation, and additionally required
the personal appearance of the owner and a GM representative, and the work of
an unpaid volunteer arbitrator. The arbitrators in the program were required to
attend training sessions and prepare written resolutions of their cases.
Looking first at arbitrated cases, which required the greatest investment of
resources, there were 14,187 arbitrations from the beginning of the program
through July 1987."s Each arbitration required the participation of the car owner,
a GM representative, and a volunteer arbitrator. If a fair estimate of the time each
of these individuals devoted to each arbitration would be between one and four
hours, the total amount of labor represented would be from about 42,000 to
170,000 hours. If those hours were valued at between $10 and $50 an hour, that
labor cost would be somewhere between $420,000 and $8.5 million. These figures
are selected arbitrarily, but if accurate information were available, it is reasonable
to assume that a documented estimate would fall within the wide range provided
by these examples. Far from being cost-free, the ADR program is expensive.
Besides these estimated costs of participation in arbitration, other expenditures
were required: the BBB offices maintained records and trained arbitrators, BBB
employees reviewed arbitrators' decisions, and GM trained its representatives and
developed procedures for monitoring the program.
The mediation component of the program preceded each arbitrated case, and
was also the program's sole procedure for a great many other cases. About
194,000 cases were involved in mediation through July 1987. What is a fair
estimate of the costs involved in each of these cases? The owner was required to
communicate with a BBB, usually in person. GM's employees analyzed each case
and formulated a settlement offer. A BBB employee communicated the GM

75. FTC Press Release (September 22, 1986) reports a total of 4,487 cases pursued through
arbitration from January 1984 through September 1985. FiC Press Release (September 23, 1988) at
5, reports 9,700 cases pursued through arbitration, from October 1985 through July 1987.
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decision to the car owner. Records were kept of these procedural stages. If all
this effort cost only $10 a case, $1.94 million was expended. If a fair estimate
would be $20 a case, then the total cost was nearly $4 million.
Adding these rough valuations, the total expenditure for the mediation and
arbitration program, to serve 194,000 cases, was many millions of dollars in
resources. Traditional litigation would have required FTC staff work for several
years, defense costs for GM for several years, and costs of administering the
agency trial process and possible judicial review of the agency's action. Huge
costs might have been required for the traditional process, but it is clear that bit
by bit and case by case, ADR has been extremely costly itself.
C. Speed
Each individual case handled in the program was resolved in a much shorter
span of time from initiation to completion than would have been the case had the
FTC prosecuted a single action on behalf of all affected owners. As events have
shown, however, the commissioners supporting the settlement may have
overestimated the total savings of time. An anticipated benefit of the settlement
was that it would deliver compensation to owners more quickly than standard
litigation. This undoubtedly was true for many early participants in the program.
It should be noted, however, that the program will continue through 1991, and that
a significant number of cases were resolved in the period ending as late as July
1987. FTC cases often take many years to reach their conclusions. So, when the
settlement was being considered in 1983, it may have seemed clear that money
available to owners in 1984 would be much more worthwhile to them than money
possibly available to them at some distant time in the future. Hindsight shows that
many participants in the program did not receive payments until 1987, and that
many more will be paid in the period from 1987 through 1991. The gap between
the possible ending date of an FTC action and the time at which money was made
available to consumers through the ADR process approved in the settlement was
very large for cases that reached the ADR process in the early period of its
existence. For the many cases that reached the process in 1988 or 1989, or that
will reach it during the final years of its existence, the time savings issue is much
less important.76

76. According to the FTC Press Releases (Sept. 22, 1986, and Sept. 23, 1988), 75,458 cases were
processed in the program's first 13 months; 37,832 cases were processed in the next seven months; and
81,055 cases were processed in the next 22 months. These three periods vary in length, but it may be
instructive to note that the average number of cases per month, from the first reporting period through
the third reporting period, was 5,804, 5,404 and 3,684. Apparently, redress came to many consumers
several years after the initial occurrence of the alleged GM wrongdoing.
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D. Satisfaction
The quantitative data provided by the FTC provide very little evidence about
how well users of the program liked it. Some people who made an inquiry and
then did not pursue a case to mediation or arbitration were probably dissatisfied
with some aspects of the program, such as the amount of effort required to obtain
redress, or the amount of anticipated redress to be received from their efforts.
Others left the program because their complaints were suitable for treatment in a
separate GM-BBB process." More than 20 percent of participants failed to
complete the program in the period ending July 1987.78 A uniform resolution
achieved through traditional regulatory action would have directed a remedy to
these individuals.
Those continuing past the mediation phase to arbitration were obviously
dissatisfied with the mediation results. As was seen in Table 1, the percent of
caseload resolved in mediation varied widely from city to city. For cities in the
lowest quartile on that measure, the average percent of caseload resolved in
mediation was 70.4 percent. This suggests that, in at least some cities, a major
component of the program failed to satisfy a large number of participants. The
fact that some other cities were able to resolve almost all of their complaints in
mediation suggests that in the low mediation percentage cities, something was
flawed in the procedures themselves. Suspecting that the process was flawed is
reasonable, since it would be hard to believe that the customers and GM
representatives in some cities were very different in their demands and incentives
from those in other cities.
In considering user satisfaction, a vital issue is determined by the definition
of "user." In one sense, this dispute resolution process was intended to serve all
victims of the alleged abuse--all purchasers of cars with the "specified components." If about 20 million vehicles were affected, the rate of participation in the
ADR program indicates that about one out of a hundred potential victims sought
redress.79 A program that delivers justice to such a small subset of victims ought
not to be thought of as satisfying the legitimate compensation needs of the overall

77.

In addition to the program established under the settlement, GM has provided mediation at

BBBs for some owners of other vehicles voluntarily and without the reporting requirements of the
FTC-ordered program. See FTC Analysis 1985-87, supra note 13, at 2 (Besides the arbitration and
mediation required for "specified components" disputes, GM offered similar dispute resolution options
for car owners with disputes concerning automobiles' power-trains).
78. The FTC's data on those who dropped out of the program report cases where consumers were
found to be ineligible for the program because their complaint did not involye one of the "specified
components" and cases where consumers decided not to pursue eligible claims. Some of those whose
problems did not involve specified components were eligible to have their cases treated inanother GMBBB program dealing with power-train disputes. In the reporting period covering October 1985
through July 1987, 104,672 people entered the program, but only 81,055 completed it. This represents
a loss of 23,707 individuals, or 22.6 percent of participants. See FTC Analysis 1985-87, supra note
13, at 4.
79. This estimate is based on the total number of participants through July 1987, stated as about

194,000. (200,000 is 1% of 20,000,000.)
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group. Delivery of redress to only a small percentage of those eligible for it is
particularly unjust in the circumstance of an innovative third party system, since
it is likely that those who participated in it were disproportionately drawn from the
better educated and better informed owners among all the owners of affected cars.
Under the settlement, special notification of the ADR process was to be made to
individuals who had already complained to law enforcement officials or to the
FTC, and notification of the program was also required to be given to consumers
who "identify a specified component."80 These notification provisions favored
articulate and rights-conscious customers.
E. RelationshipBetween Scholarly
Expectations and Actual Experience
Expectations typically expressed by scholars and advocates of ADR seem not
to have been fulfilled by the GM program. This reflects some special aspects of
its organization.
The mediation component did not involve face-to-face
discussions between car owners and GM representatives, and apparently consisted
only of the communication of owners' requests and GM's settlement offers
through the medium of a passive BBB employee. This prevented the parties from
having the benefit of hearing each other's point of view on past occurrences and
proper future actions in response to those past events. It also prevented the parties
from developing collaborative relationships in which they might have developed
innovative resolutions.
Certain social factors that may facilitate successful mediation are not present
in the buyer-seller context. For example, buyers and a single car company do not
have a shared perception of the need for their relationship to continue after the
current dispute is ended. In buyer-seller disputes between a large seller and a
local buyer, there is not likely to be any background of previous successful
interactions to provide a common base for developing a solution to the present
problem. The third parties involved in the GM program were either noninteractive BBB employees who conveyed information between the buyer and GM
without elaboration during the mediation phase, or non-expert volunteer arbitrators.
While these third parties were assuredly neutral, they did not possess expertise in
mediation, arbitration, or car problems.
The possible failure of the program to reach large numbers of affected
consumers could have been predicted, since recourse to third parties is a highly
unusual response to buyer-seller problems. Particularly where the subject matter
of a dispute involves issues of judgment or difficult proof, consumers may be
reluctant to invest the time and psychological resources required to participate in
an ADR program, because predictable rewards for that effort are not present."'
While benefits of ADR such as individual satisfaction and self-transformation may
have been realized by some program participants, those social gains must be

80. General Motors Corp., 102 F.T.C. at 1763.
81. A. BEST, supra note 49, at ch. 3.
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balanced against the failure of the system to demonstrate that it provided equal
treatment to equivalent cases and delivered redress to a significant portion of those
eligible for it.
The GM program had its strongest impact on car owners who participated in
it. In contrast, traditional litigation and regulatory processes could have affected
third parties as well as the disputants. Conventional procedures might have
produced authoritative or standard-setting results and might have created broad
social consequences. It cannot be known whether the burdens GM has borne as
a result of the FTC settlement have influenced GM and other car manufacturers
to avoid the type of marketing practice that allegedly violated the FTC Act.
Moreover, the settlement provided no guide for future actions by GM and other
sellers with regard to what disclosures should be made when marketing vehicles
with components of less than typical durability. And as a deterrent to conduct that
might in the future overstep the as yet undrawn line of legality on this topic, the
settlement cannot be seen as a strong force. Handling the disputes in the program
may have cost GM less than it would have spent operating in standard corporate
channels. Compared to the cost of litigation, the program was probably a bargain
for the company, 2 and thus cannot sensibly be characterized as providing any
incentive for GM to change future conduct.
F. Recommendations for FutureFTC Actions
The data analyzed in this Article suggest that the GM-BBB program has not
applied uniform standards to similar cases to produce similar results. Rather, case
outcome seems to be affected significantly by factors ordinarily considered
extraneous to justice, such as the total caseload of the program in which a case is
handled. Ignorance regarding the causes of the apparent city-to-city discrepancies
in the program's operation presents a dilemma for consumer advocates, proponents
of alternative dispute resolution, and the FTC. A hypothetical consumer who
compared the prospects of obtaining no recovery at all or obtaining recovery
through an informal process would be wise to choose the recovery, even if the
consumer knew its amount ultimately might not have a fair relationship to
recoveries obtained by other consumers with similar claims. Failure to provide
similar results in similar cases is disturbing, but the program has delivered
hundreds of dollars to many individual participants.
The FTC's choice to secure mediation and arbitration instead of attempting
to obtain uniform payments to the entire class of customers with cars containing
specified components calls into question a range of political issues. Professor
Sally Engle Merry has urged that analysis of dispute resolution must consider its
political implications."3 At one extreme, this point of view requires considering

82. See Widdows, Consumer Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution Mechanism in Customer-Seller
Disputes over Automobile Purchases, 42 ARB. J. 17, 22 (Mar. 1987) ("[Arbitration may be a better
deal for sellers than for consumers.").
83. Merry, supra note 34.
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whether dispute processes are a means to palliate masses of abused consumers
while diverting them from a revolutionary struggle for democratic socialism."
On a smaller but highly important scale, "political" analysis recalls the hypothesis
that "repeat players" who are experienced in particular types of disputes have
major advantages, as in a set of disputes involving millions of individual buyers
and only one manufacturer.85
The question "compared to what?" is therefore crucial for evaluating the
program. If consumers' alternative to the establishment of the program was to
obtain no recovery, the program has been a success. If, in the absence of the
program, consumers might have received court-ordered payments of redress (after
lengthy FTC litigation), then the desirability of the program is less clear. Longdelayed uniform payments to car owners are less beneficial to them than prompt
payments. Balanced against that fact, however, are two aspects of the program.
First, it is not free to participants, in the sense that it requires significant
expenditures of time, effort, and emotional involvement. It also has been costly
to General Motors. Second, the program's lack of uniform payments may not
indicate the virtue of precisely tailored responses to individual cases, but may
relate more to other factors such as the volume of caseload at a particular program
location. Uniformity of payment might be considered an undesirable attribute of
the redress mode that seeks judicial determination of a standard reimbursement.
However, if the varied payments produced through the expenditures of money and
time required in mediation and arbitration are themselves not well-related to the
specifics of particular cases, then their variety is irrelevant to the goal of fair
compensation, and it cannot support a preference for the case-by-case method of
dispute resolution.
The FTC has not called for or conducted an analysis of possible explanations
for the discrepant treatment of claims in the various participating cities. It ought
to do so, and it should not praise the program in the absence of information
revealing the causes of its apparent city-to-city discrepancies. The FTC should
also refrain from replicating the GM program in new cases. It is unfortunate that
the FTC recently settled a complaint against the makers of Volkswagen
automobiles by accepting the company's agreement to adopt a BBB mediation and
arbitration similar to the GM program. 6 The GM program has been beneficial
to some consumers. If similar programs are adopted by manufacturers as a matter
of business judgment, they may succeed or fail in the marketplace.87 However,

84. THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, VOL 1:' THE AMEucAN ExPERENcE, (R. Abel ed.
1982).
85. Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,
9 L & SOC'Y REv. 95 (1974).
86. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 110 F.T.C. 392 (1988).
87. The invisible hand may touch complaint-handling operations only lightly. Consumers are
often unaware of them and may lack any ability to know which are operating well and which are
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a government agency should accept a mediation-arbitration program as an adequate
means of providing a correction for past misconduct only if there is confidence
that the mechanism will work fairly. Experience with the FTC-GM settlement
does not justify that confidence.
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